The humane center of Peter Robinson's style of psychology is a desire (more unusual than perhaps it ought to be in an academic psychologist) to say something sensible that would interest the person in the street.
Without sacrificing intellectual rigor, Robinson wants psychology to speak directly (and unpretentiously) to ordinary people about ordinary lives. In this article, I want to see how it might do so by combining three threads that Robinson worked on at one time or another in his career: language (e.g., Robinson, 1972) , truth (or rather, its opposites and rivals: dissembling, euphemism, and discretion) (Robinson, 1996a) , and the description of persons in society (e.g., Robinson, 1985b ; see also his editorship of the Festschrift for Henri Tajfel in Robinson, 1996b) . Now, as it happens, I will take all three in a discursive direction that Robinson was sympathetic to but more than a little wary of in the 1980s (Robinson, 1985a) . At that stage I think I would have shared his views. Now, with a more mature and settled analytical armory available to the discursive psychologist, I think the job can be done with greater confidence and better return. If I make a decent case, then I will have vindicated Robinson's cautious hopes for the sort of thing a language-oriented social psychologist might do.
What I aim to do is look at language in use (or "talk in interaction" in its more righteous formulation; see Schegloff, 1988) and analyze some quite surprising dealings between people in a certain institutional relationship (psychologists and people they are assessing for their "quality of life"). The episodes are surprising only because they happened to be tape recorded and their inner workings are made visible; otherwise, they are wholly unexceptional and would have passed without comment of any sort, had they not become the focus of some careful going-over. 1 In the extracts, I shall be showing the threads of language, truth, and person description twist in the following way. In trying to use language truthful to what they see as the situation of their respondents, the psychologists manage to subvert their own professional standards and, unwittingly, to construct a limited and limiting social stereotype of the person with whom they are speaking. That, I think, would genuinely be of interest to the person in the street (certainly it would be to the parties concerned in these episodes, and their friends and associates), and I think that Robinson would approve of the gentle unmasking that the work achieves. Language describes persons, and when it is used discreetly, one has to prick up one's ears and listen closely for just what is going on between the lines.
The bare bones of the story will be these. Faced with an interview script whose questions (like any questions) might not be appropriate for their intended audience, the questioner will exercise some editorial discretion. The words will change. But we will notice that the words don't change at random; they change systematically, and in a way fitted to the recipient. That's the language and social-descriptions-of-persons threads of the three I have in mind. Now the truth (or dissembling) strand: The language changes in such a way as to gloss over some rather challenging, and perhaps impolite or face-threatening, facts (as the questioner sees them) about the respondent's life. As much as any questioner can, the interviewer will avoid asking those questions. That means using euphemism, circumlocution, and paraphrase, or simply cutting the question out entirely. All of those evasive actions are based on presumptions about what the respondent's life is like. We might agree or disagree with them. But they are powerful molds into which the respondent's answers are to be poured. Part of the analysis will be to pick away and find what those presuppositions and presumptions are, and what image the mold represents.
ANALYSIS: PREAMBLE
Social psychologists interested in language hardly need telling that there is slippage between what is written down on paper and how it emerges when read, even in the most controlled of circumstances. No orthography can notate the extraordinary range of music that lips, tongue, breath, and throat produce. Only our computers' robotic scriptto-speech program will ever read out the same sounds twice. That's only the start of it, of course; leaving aside physiology, the same words will sound very different coming from the lips of two different speakers, or the same speaker on two occasions, with intonation, stress, pausing, and other colors added on. And then there is the free rein of speaker choice in editing the script-ellipsis, contraction, paraphrasis, repetition, and so forth. With the best of faith, two actors reading the same script will produce two different performances, whether they like it or not.
The question is, are such differences-from involuntary mumbling to deliberate wholesale editing-consequential? The social scientist might say, "Consequential for whom?" If the question is left in the abstract, it belongs only to the philologist wanting evidence of lexical variation, or perhaps to the cognitively disposed grammarian looking for glimmers of deep ore in surface sand. For such folk, the consequentiality of a choice among alternatives is in the system of language itself-Why this rather than that as a lexical choice or a legal syntactic construction? Other folk, keener on the social force of what is said, will look for consequentiality outside the system-and they will ask, "Are any such differences in intonation, style, and so on consequential for the people in the interaction?" Now, consequentiality in the interaction plays out in two main sorts of ways: one visible, one less directly so (but still public). And here we are in territory opened up by Harvey Sacks in his magisterial Lectures on Conversation, published in 1992 and not easily available to a general readership before then; a pity, because I suspect Robinson would have found them a good deal more congenial than the turn-taking work he was reading under the heading "conversation analysis" when he wrote his survey in the mid-1980s (Robinson, 1985a ).
Sacks's insight was to see how social scientists could set their descriptions of social affairs on the bedrock proof of how people in a scene displayed their understandings of what they were doing. Gone would be the bad old ways of imposing our ideas of what was happening onto hapless subjects who would have no say in the matter. Now we would respect their dealings with each other, watch carefully, and see what difference one's behavior made to the other. And, of course, the top currency in which behavior is traded is language.
Consequentiality, for Sacks and his followers in Conversation Analysis (CA) thereafter, is something you can see in interaction as it develops. Something is consequential inasmuch as it makes a visible difference-in how the other party reacts to it, for example, or how it shapes what gets said or not said. It is up to people in their live interaction to make things count, or not count, as consequential. This is the normative point that escaped Robinson' he was by what he saw as CA's merely mechanical description of conversation's workings. His own affection for the work of linguistic philosophers like J. L. Austin would have made him very sympathetic to the CA observation that there is no point in asking a question in a way that can't be decoded by others as asking a question. The speaker has to cast it in a form recognizable as such-and the best proof that it has worked is that what one gets back will be something recognizable as an answer. And if it is not, the nonanswerer is accountable for his or her omission. Of course, people play with this rule all the time, breaking it and flouting it so as to exploit its expected rule; but it does rule, because intelligible life would be unimaginable without it, and the facts of the matter are that the spoken language is an incessant stream of confirming evidence. I said that Sacks's work on consequentiality pans out in two ways-one of them is to seek comfort in one's interpretation of an utterance by looking at what precedes it and what follows it, to see how the speakers themselves dispose of it-but there is another, and a logically prior one, too. This is Sacks's perhaps less radical contribution, though still enormously useful: to pay attention to the quasi-logical properties of the terms chosen by the speaker, especially, and dramatically, the terms the speaker selects for categories of people and their associated characteristic features. So we make a mental note that the speaker has addressed someone as tu rather than vous, and think through our understanding of what implications that conventionally has for the people involved. Of course, we shall need to see how such implications are responded to by those concerned, but as culturally competent fellow members of their society, we can make (in fact have to make) sensible approximations of what it is that has been put in front of them.
This sounds like something of a platitude when just written down flat without showing what sparks it strikes in actually analyzing a given piece of talk, but things should become a bit clearer as we work through the empirical samples. Remember that we want to put the spotlight on the interweaving of language, dissembling, and the categorization of persons. What the qualititative beam will reveal, I think, is that there are things going on that are rather more subtle than the sorts of techniques usually available to the quantitative social psychologist. We shall see how choice of language-the variety of ways of expressing a given script-is consequential for the people involved.
THE DATA
The first thing I should say (and here I'm referring to material published elsewhere, so I shall be brief) is that conversation analysts know full well that scripts are delivered differently in life than on the page. This is nicely attested in a variety of language-in-use studies, starting with the close analyses of structured tests (Marlaire & Maynard, 1990; Maynard & Marlaire, 1992) and standardized interviews (Houtkoop-Steenstra, 1995 , 1996 Suchman & Jordan, 1990) . All show the work that goes into realizing a script, even when the speaker is acting under the severest of institutional demands to be psychometrically proper and respect the exact wording of the questions. Here is a glimpse of the sort of alteration that can creep in. The official question is meant to be, "Have you or have you not completed this education, or are you still busy with it?" 2 In this example from Houtkoop-Steenstra (1995, p. 99) , this is what the interviewer actually says ("v.g.l.o." is a Dutch educational institution): What we see at the arrowed line is the question tailored to predict a confirmation of a positive answer when, technically, both alternatives should have been presented explicitly and with equal weight so as not to prejudice the issue. Now, there are many things one can say about the whys and wherefores of such a change. It would be tempting to say that the interviewer wants to protect the respondent's self-esteem, to be polite, or to use the least presumptive way of talking so as not to threaten their "face." I'm happy not choosing among them, partly because I'm not sure how they differ (except that I suspect that those three formulations are more or less uncomfortable to those among us who fidget and fret when we hear intentional, "wanting" explanations of visible actions). What conversation analysts and discursive psychologists would rather do, because the ground is safer, is hold off such worries and think instead about what it means for such a thing to have happened. I know this sounds rather a circumlocutory way of saying something, but it does get us off the dangerous territory of intentions and desires and other unknowables. If we just concentrate on the rhetorical effect of such a way of changing the script-the effect as understandable by the competent cultural member, particularized into the specific interactions position she or he is holding just at that momentthen we are at least appealing to very public standards. Well, what are the effects of that kind of editing of the official script in the example above? One thing is obvious, and just a matter of rephrasing what we agreed above-the respondent ends up being treated as probably not having problems completing a certain kind of schooling. But now we can add in the implications, without worrying about the interviewer's inner intentions: We see that to treat the respondent so brings with it a host of competing and contradictory implications-at the most favorable, that he or she has successfully completed schooling, hence the redundancy of the negative alternative. At the most unfavorable, the implication is that the respondent is so unlikely, if left to their own devices, to respond positively to the question that the interviewer engineers things to lessen the risk. That is the sort of linguistic fallout that I shall be concentrating on in the rest of the article, and it is where we will see language, discretion, and the construction of persons come together.
EDITING A SCRIPT TO REFLECT A PERCEIVED IMAGE OF A PERSON-AND TO PERPETUATE IT?
Now let's move on to the main dish on the menu. Here we have a stretch of talk between two people. Now, the reader will have to take my word for a few things about the setup, which would be too laborious to warrant by chapter and verse-by extensive quotation from earlier in the interview-but which will help animate the scene below. We will take it just as scene setting, mind, and try to watch that the animation doesn't get out of control and dominate what we make of what is being said. "I" is an interviewer who holds and ostensibly reads from a printed questionnaire on which the answers of the respondent (JO) are recorded in summary as alternative 1, 2, or 3.
If we peer over the interviewer's shoulder, we can read the following instructions among those printed on the front of the questionnaire:
If the respondent consents, the examiner proceeds to administer the 40 items. When reading the items, pay close attention to the exact wording. You may paraphrase items and repeat them as often as necessary to ensure the respondent's understanding of the item content.
"Pay close attention" to the items, but the interviewer is allowed to "paraphrase items and repeat them as often as necessary." Very well. It won't surprise us that a lot of paraphrasing goes on (on a generous count, only about 1 in 8 of the questions are asking anything literally; on a stricter count, the number plummets to about 1 in 50) (see Antaki, 1999) . Paraphrasing, of course, is decidedly not a proper thing to do by the canons of strict psychometric testing theory (e.g., see the warnings about it in such authorities as Fowler & Mangione, 1990) , but there's no need to go into that here. What we want to spot is the sort of paraphrase that's used, and what it tells us about how I deals with JO (the interviewer is female and JO is male, so from now on pronouns will be used where it helps the flow).
We meet the speakers at a point about three quarters of the way through the printed interview schedule. The interviewer has reached a section where these questions are to be asked: Antaki / INTERVIEWER SCRIPTS 201 Question 36. How often do you attend recreational activities (homes, parties, dances, concerts, plays) in your community? (3 to 4 times per month, 1 to 2 times per month, less than 1 per month) Question 37. Do you participate actively in those recreational activities? (usually, most of the time; frequently, about half the time; seldom or never)
Now here is what the interviewer actually said, along with JO's responses. Transcription uses the conventions established in Conversation Analysis; for a full account, see Atkinson and Heritage (1984, pp. ix-xvi The interviewer could, of course, ignore JO's "no" and continue with the list; that is, treat JO's response as not heard or not hearable. But that risks sounding as if one is steamrolling through the other's talk-even more so when what the other is saying could indeed count as a genuine answer to a question that one has posed. That is to say, more technically, if "A" utters something that is eminently hearable as a fully formed question (as our interviewer does), then, other things being equal, "B" has a discursive right to provide (and be heard to provide) the answer that is the now-expectable second part of the questionanswer pair. So if A presses on without acknowledging B, then A gives off the impression of denying B a normal discursive right-"steamrollering" or "not listening" would be the everyday gloss.
WHAT COMPETENCES ARE AT ISSUE?
Our interviewer then has a dilemma. On one hand, interviewers should follow the psychometric rule and perform the question as writtenbut that would sound as if she isn't listening to JO. On the other hand, Antaki / INTERVIEWER SCRIPTS 203 the interviewer could stop and acknowledge-but that would mean that the psychometric integrity of the question would be fatally compromised.
In deciding between the horns of the dilemma, there is an interesting calculation to be made. The interviewer would be judging the conventional range of implications of her behavior-what her talk "gives off," as Sacks (1992) would put it. Under what circumstances would she press on with the question without risking looking abrupt? Or rather, when looking abrupt would not necessarily be out of order? Perhaps when one can be confident that one's hearer will understand why their normal discursive right must in this case be overridden. Imagine the scenario-you are the interviewer, and you have explained to the respondent before you start that they must wait right until the end of the question before they speak. They agree, and you kick off. The first question goes all right. On the second question, perhaps because old habits break through, your respondent can't delay answering before the end. But you nevertheless press on, knowing that your interlocutor will immediately understand why you are doing so-after all, you have just explained it all. Perhaps on realizing what he's done, the respondent goes "oh," looks sheepish, perhaps says "tsk" quietly and puts hand to mouth, and answers again when you are done. The incident has passed off fine. You have treated your respondent as understanding why you must go on, and the respondent seems to signal that they aren't treating you as being abrupt. Now, none of this happens here, and the inference we might make is that the interviewer changes tack because she does not trust or expect JO to make the normal inferences. Or rather-to get away from speculation about the interviewer's state of mind-we can say that she does not treat JO as being able to make those inferences. That is, she does not extend to JO the competence that would be extended to the normal interlocutor who would immediately infer that the interviewer is merely doing his or her psychometric duty.
The particular competence that JO is being denied is the competence to see that being ignored (if that is what the interviewer's continuation of her question would have sounded like) is a legitimate, routine part of official question-asking with no implication of personal insult. In other words, JO is being treated as having enough linguistic and cognitive ability to make some inferences but not others. He is treated as being aware of insult, but not of special rules of discourse that allow questions to run on. It is not impossible to range these two competences on a hierarchy. Being sensitive to insult-especially by misunderstandinglooks lower down some cognitive scale or even some "maturational" scale than understanding the special rules of strict questioning. It would be mad to build much on this sliver of talk and this teasing out of implications, but it is suggestive-and we shall see more in the same vein.
MORE LIMITATIONS
Recall that the interviewer has to place on the record the question, How often do you attend recreational activities (homes, parties, dances, concerts, plays) in your community? So far, she has received an answer to "homes." She continues: Taking all that together, the interviewer has got an answer to how often JO goes to people's homes and to parties. She does not know how often JO goes to the other sites on the list-dances, concerts, plays. If we put aside anything like strict psychometric literalness, there are a number of other possible examples of recreational activities that are askable (e.g., clubs, bars, the movies, etc.), should the interviewer have felt that that particular list of three was too restrictive or wrong in some way. The interesting thing is that she doesn't. The question is edited down to "other people's homes" and "parties." What can we make of that? There are a number of possible interpretations. The most orthodox is that sufficient information has been collected to make the remainder of the question redundant; the interviewer now knows where to locate JO's response on the answer alternatives. Interviewers are often observed to tailor questions pragmatically-to acknowledge previously given information, for example (even though that is, strictly speaking, psychometrically improper). But that interpretation is not specially convincing here. JO has only responded to parties and homes so far; logically, offering him more alternatives would give a chance to accumulate more visits to more sites, and make his score more accurate. So even within the folk wisdom of interviewer tradecraft, there isn't a good case to be made for cutting off the question. But even supposing that this was what motivated the interviewer, the question remains: How is it that what JO says can be taken to count as enough evidence? Antaki / INTERVIEWER SCRIPTS 205 This is where we read the design of what appears in the question, and what does not, as being consequential. To cut out reference to dances, concerts, plays-or any other event-is to treat these as not relevantly askable. It is to treat JO as having no such visits to report, and no improvements to enter. Two alternatives are enough to make an accurate estimate of his social life.
IS THIS "DISSEMBLING"?
To an extent, yes. We are fully prepared for interviewers to edit, rephrase, and paraphrase the questions that they are supposed to ask. But there is something in what this interviewer is doing (and she is not alone; see a comparison with others in Antaki, 1999 ) that seems to be a matter of editing to avoid something, of tailoring the questions to skirt around some reality present to both parties, or present at least to the interviewer. For an interviewer not to carry on with a legitimately phrased question, and not to present the full range of answers, is to imply some mistrust that the respondent can cope with the proper version on the printed questionnaire. It is as if the question as set is too harsh and must be softened; that is dissembling. Someone could call it that and mean that the interviewer means to dissemble, she intends to speak in such a way as to assume that JO has or lacks friends and a full social life. I don't use the word that way. Whether the interviewer's intentions are honorable (or whether she has any particular intentions or motivations one way or the other), I don't know and can't tell. What I'm noticing is not her motivation, but the dissembling nature of the dissonance between what is written and what she says.
That becomes more dramatic in the last section I want to dwell on. Recall that the interviewer has to obtain a recordable answer to the official question: We know that "those recreational activities" in the last question had already been pruned back. Now we see that the interviewer uproots the entire bush and replaces it with a very specific, narrowly focused, yes/no question: "Do you have a bit of a drink?" Now, this question may work as a presequence, the sort of orderly signal of upcoming traffic identified very early on in conversation analysis (Schegloff, 1980 The entire sequence might itself be a part of a more extended sequence, perhaps initiating a series of establishing prefaces and open-ended invitations (e.g., Do you like music? What sort? Do you like talking to people? What about?). A series like that would offer JO more alternatives to display his engagement with the world. But the series doesn't come. The interviewer moves away from asking about JO's participation in activities-how often he does things-and back to the previous question: how many sorts of things he goes to. The interviewer articulates a formulation of where the party was, and that JO went to no other parties. Then she moves to the next question. So the topic of drinking gets elaborated out into an open-ended question of what he drinks, but gets developed no further. The interviewer doesn't follow it up with a series of activities for JO to respond to (bars, church, football matches), and which would make his score more accurate as an index of his social participation. Again, we have two sorts of interpretation, one going further than the other. The orthodox explanation would be that enough has been learned for an adequate answer to be entered. But we still ask, as before, how it is that the interviewer judges that this is enough? We see that the editing betrays the interviewer's treatment of JO as not having the competences that would allow him to deal happily with any further, or wider, alternatives she might put before him.
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Not only does she not give the full range as set out in the official question, she edits the question wholesale, and it becomes a question about whether he likes drinking and what he drinks. That is what he is taken to do at parties-drink. It is done with a light touch, to be surethere is plenty of laughter bubbling through the interviewer's words (though not in JO's, interestingly enough). But nevertheless, it is a steep narrowing of the official question, "Do you participate actively in those recreational activities?" Whatever the motivation, the effect of the interviewer's editing-the dissembling-is to cast JO as not being able to respond adequately to any wider horizons than that. Perhaps this is to be heard as the interviewer treating him as not being able to understand what "participate actively" means. Then she has to find an alternative. Whatever she offers, she runs the dangers of implication. If she offers a whole range of specific alternatives, he might answer "no" to each one, with obvious consequences. If she allows him an openended question, he may still come up with nothing, with the same consequences. It is safer to nominate something very specific (as she does), get it established with a prequestion, and then ask the open-ended question. It is safer, but-of course-it reduces "active participation in the community" (the official language of the question) to "having a drink"-a single, not specially noble, recreation.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR MARRIAGE
One last slice of the interviewer's editing. We look across at the whole series of interviews and see how the interviewer copes with the following official question: The term girlfriend or boyfriend was used in all those examples and in every one of the interviews (I have tapes of 12 in all). The first thing to say about it is that it presumes (perhaps on the basis of the interviewer's prior knowledge) that the respondents are not in fact married and are to be treated as heterosexual. Let us just assume that is the case. Then the interviewer has to ask about potential partners. To use the official expression "opportunities to date or marry" might have been rejected simply on the basis of cognitive difficulty and the unfamiliarity of the Americanism of "date." The interviewer is faced with a choice of expressions to put before the respondent. In British English, these would be fiancée/fiancé, partner, gentleman/lady friend, lover, or a circumlocution like "special friend," "someone you're seeing" or "someone you're going out with," "someone in your life," or "someone you're having a relationship with." The interviewer might cast it as an activity and ask if he or she is seeing, going out with, courting, or in a relationship with someone.
Certainly the term girlfriend/boyfriend has the virtue of being cognitively simple, compared with some of those alternatives (the ambiguities of "partner" or "someone in your life", for example, might be hard for these respondents). But why not fiancée/fiancé, say, or "someone you're going out with?" My own intuition tells me that although none of the alternatives are specially natural when talking with and about British adults, girlfriend/boyfriend is somewhere on the lower slopes of acceptability. I would find it odd to use the term if I was inquiring, face-to-face, whether an adult friend was seeing anyone (as I suppose I would put it). I might use the term in reference to some third party, and I might use it in describing my own relationship with someone, but for one to put such a term to an adult, in Britain, strikes me as unusual.
It would be too glib to conclude merely that the interviewer is being patronizing. It's more productive, I think, to see the interviewer as negotiating safe passage between competing dangers-treating the respondent as having certain possibilities open to them rather than others, and designing their talk so as to maximize the possibility of a positive response and the arrival at a safe haven. Terms that risk incomprehension through unfamiliarity or cognitive load are discarded. But more tellingly, terms are rejected if they have strong implications of sexual activity (lover), serious commitment (fiancée/fiancé, courting), and maturity in general (someone in your life, someone you're having a relationship with, etc.). All of these, it is implied, are inappropriate for JO and the other respondents.
The positive thing about girlfriend/boyfriend is that, unlike all these others, they can be heard ironically. I don't mean that they are sneering or sarcastic; I mean that they are ambiguous as to literality. They could refer to sexual partners but need not. So a positive response is maximized, at exactly the same time as its meaning is discreetly veiled over. JO and the others are treated as having no answer to a question unambiguously about sex, seriousness, and maturity. By being given this dissembling euphemism, they emerge as people who cannot be trusted adequately to deal with, and respond positively to, the less discreet, blunter reality of life.
LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND PERSONS
What shall we make of all this, and how does it bear on that braid I was weaving-the twist of language, dissembling, and the categorization of persons? What would Robinson say about it?
He would, I think, welcome it as partial fulfillment of his prediction, made in 1990 with Howard Giles, that interest in language and categories of people was shifting from class and race toward "those who are defined administratively or socially as physically, mentally or emotionally disabled" (p. 5). What I hope I have shown is that Robinson and Giles were right to use the formulation "defined administratively or socially." I've tried to show how that defining is done, not only by the cold print in the medical dossier, but live, online, and in warm talk by the serving professional.
The interviewing psychologist's choice of terms, manner of delivery, pursuit of answer, and acceptance of response, sensitive as they might be, all work to define JO and the other respondents as not up to the normal standards of social life, personal competence, and sexual love. I don't know whether this is a true reflection of the situation they find themselves in. Perhaps it is. It would be against common sense to suppose that they live the lives open to those lucky enough to enjoy the comforts of nondisabled society. But the point is that the psychologists' use of dissembling language begs the question; JO and the others are treated as socially disabled from the start, and easy questions are substituted for hard ones. That means that we will never know just how bad their lives actually are. What of Robinson's warning, in the same set of predictions, that "if discourse analysts become too self-critical, they will not generate the work?" (Robinson & Giles, 1990, p. 6) . Well, I hope I have shown what a bit of confidence can do (even, perhaps, at the risk of being rather too confident at times; there is much in this analysis that wants slower and more technical anatomy). The confidence comes from discourse analysis having a mature set of methods to work with, tempered in the heat of analysis elsewhere. The ones I've used here come from the work of Harvey Sacks and those who have followed him, especially the discursive psychologists (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Harré & Stearns, 1995; see Edwards, 1995 , for the relation between Sacks's work and the aims and ambitions of psychology). Other discourse analysts have other totems. If there is the self-criticism that Robinson and Giles worried about, it is now a healthy sort of self-reflection, trying to use methods that would work as well on one's own practices as they do on those of our subjects, and that must be to the good.
It would be interesting to see whether Robinson approves of taking the social psychology of language in this direction-treating language as a set of practices that, in their sequential playing out in live talk, actually do something as significant as defining a person. It is very different from the 1970s and 1980s style of work, where language was a set of tokens that marked a predefined identity (thus, the use of Dialect X rather than standard Language Y marked one's choice of Identity X for purposes of solidarity, rebelliousness, and so forth). It is certainly less quantifiable, perhaps essentially so. That makes it a little distant from the sort of methods that most social psychologists feel comfortable with. It certainly encourages reflexivity and makes us much more cautious about categorizing our subjects. We leave it to them to treat each other as normal or abnormal, adult or child, able or disabled.
Robinson was, in 1985, very decided in his views about what discourse analysis could do. On one hand, the sort of thing I've attempted here is a good example of his prediction that the work of critical social psychologists-he had in mind Harré and Berger and Luckman, who don't really qualify, but leave that aside-"will oblige social psychologists to bring behavior through real time back into their perspective, to examine the interactions between texts and the maintenance and development of social relations, and to examine the interplay between these and problems of individual and social identity " (1985a, p. 140) . In Antaki / INTERVIEWER SCRIPTS 211 analyzing the interviewer's and JO's actions, we've seen the "real time" of their exchange of talk, we've seen how the text of the official interview interacted with "the maintenance and development of social relations"-how the script was altered and edited on the hoof-and we've seen how all of that bore on "problems of individual and social identity," namely the interviewer's construction of the respondent as a person of abysmally low social expectations. On the other hand, Robinson goes on to predict something that I think has not, and will not, come to pass, at least in the way he meant it: "When that begins to happen," he continues immediately on from the quote above, "social psychologists will bring to bear on the study of discourse its methods, methodology, and perspectives. Its methods will include an insistence on systematic sampling of populations and variables, as well as a predilection for systematic experimental testing of hypotheses" (1985a, p. 140). Discourse analysis (or at least conversation analysis, the strand of discourse work that I have tried to exemplify here) has blossomed enormously since the mid-1980s, and where psychologists like myself have taken it up, it is to supplant traditional methods and not to complement them. CA asks different questions about human life; it asks what it is and how it is done. It is logically prior to surveys and (probably) intellectually incompatible with the picture of human life that allows some psychologists still to pursue the dream of experimental control. To that extent, Robinson's hopes are frustrated. But that does mean that we reach more deeply into the details of people's lives as they are lived, and into where the action is. I think Peter Robinson would approve of that.
NOTES

